Abstract Behavior needs to be understood from early stages of software development. In this context, incremental and declarative modeling seems an attractive approach for closely capturing and analyzing requirements without early operational commitment. A traditional choice for such a kind of modeling is a logic-based approach. Unfortunately, in many cases, the formal description and validation of properties result in a daunting task, even for trained people. Moreover, some authors established some practical limitations with temporal logics expressive power. In this work, we present omega-feather weight visual scenarios (x-FVS) a declarative language, not founded on temporal logics, but on simple graphical scenarios, powerful enough to express x-regular properties. The notation is equipped with declarative semantics based on morphisms, and a tableau procedure is given enabling the possibility of automatic analysis.
Introduction
The early specification of behavior is a key activity for producing and developing high-quality software. Its main purpose is to explore and understand the behavior of the system to be developed as soon as possible. Typically early specification of behavior is expressed by a set of desirable properties that the system should satisfy, taking the form of system's goals [32] . Each property may focus on a particular aspect of the behavior of the system, thus avoiding the need of specifying the full behavior of the system. This set of desirable properties constitutes a crucial input for usual software verification techniques such as model checking [13] or model-based testing [16, 54] .
In this context, several authors identify the property specification process as one of the obstacles for the transference of software verification technology [4, 15, 22, 26, 28, 44, 49] . This is mainly because there exists a notable gap between behavior expressed in natural language and its final representation in the formal language employed in the verification process. Numerous properties that are described in a very simple and direct manner through natural language result in complex artifacts once specified using a formal notation. As a result, many practitioners in the industrial world tend to avoid the usage of formal verification [4, 28, 49] . Another obstacle is given by the expressive power of the notation used. A formal language should be expressive enough to describe all the properties of interest of the system. Ease of use and expressive power are two design principles usually in conflict. Sometimes in order to achieve a more expressive language, its usability is compromised, obtaining a cumbersome formal language [10, 45, 60] .
In this paper, we are interested in providing a language to declaratively capture the expected behavior of the system as a set of valid traces, considering a linear timeclosed system viewpoint. Our notion of requirements is based on the concept of goals or properties of the system to be, aligned to approaches like Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering [32] . In this context, behavioral properties can be regarded as hard goals. Linear temporal logics (LTL) [40] is the most known formalism for specifying the expected behavior of a system in a declarative way. LTL enables the possibility of describing how a system's events are related over time. However, writing and reviewing a property can be a very demanding task. As mentioned before, some properties are hard to express in LTL, even for trained people [4, 15, 22, 26, 28, 44, 49] . Although properties focus only on some particular interaction over the system's behavior, it can be notoriously cumbersome to accurately express them as LTL formulae. Most of the times subtle details are missed, and the intended behavior is not captured correctly.
Several attempts arise to make life easier for practitioners, in order to circumvent the complexity involved when specifying properties in LTL. The purpose of these approaches is to provide to the user an easier way to express the desired behavior. Most of them rely on the specification patterns introduced by [21, 22] . The user is presented with several patterns, i.e., a general schema describing common and recurrent solutions to a particular type of problem. Each pattern offers a natural language description of its intended behavior, which is accompanied to its translation into different formalisms. For example, the intent of the Response pattern is described as ''One or more occurrences of action result in one or more occurrences of response'' and the proposed LTL formula given in [21] is: hðaction ! eresponse). The user selects the pattern that fits better to the desired property, instantiates the general schema into the actual system, and obtains its translation into the desired formalism. However, the use of these approaches does not provide an entirely satisfactory solution due to difficulties to validate or modify the selected pattern [3, 15] . In order to perform these tasks, the user may need to handle not only the natural description of the pattern, but also its translation into a formal language, and the manipulation of these artifacts is not a trivial process. Even worse, LTL is not only complex, but not expressive enough [10, 41, 45, 60] . For instance, [58] demonstrated that LTL cannot express all x-regular properties. Additionally, LTL expressive power falls short of the practitioner wants to declaratively build a system from scratch upon the specified properties [20, 39] . In order to do so, formalisms like Büchi automata are needed, capable of expressing x-regular properties. This is especially true if one meant to completely capture declaratively the expected behavior (set of traces).
The main contribution of this work is to provide a solid foundation for the language omega-feather weight Scenarios (x-FVS), standing for a complete declarative language to specify behavior in early stages which is powerful enough to express x-regular properties. x-FVS is a simple extension of FVS [3] , a declarative language, not founded on temporal logics, but on simple graphical scenarios. In [3] FVS specifications were compared against LTL, taking as a case of study the codification of the specification patterns [22] . That work showed that FVS specifications result more succinct and likely easier to understand, manipulate, and debug than the LTL formulae proposed in [21] . In this work we introduce x-FVS, increasing FVS expressive power in order to handle x-regular properties. In other words, this work focuses on enhancing expressive power while maintaining the declarative nature of the language. This feature is achieved by introducing a distinctive type of events called ''ghost'' events that allow to predicate about behavior at a higher level of abstraction. On the top of these features, we present in this work a synthesis procedure which translates x-FVS scenarios into Büchi automata, enabling the possibility for different analyses, namely consistency checking, model checking, and oracle for runtime verification among others. We conducted three case studies based on different industrial protocol specifications to illustrate several aspects of x-FVS such as its expressive power, its ability to declaratively specify behavior, and the potential of the translation mechanism into Büchi automata. In this sense, we also developed an experiment based on the specification patterns [22] to analyze the size of the automata generated by the tableau procedure. The goal of this experiment was to indirectly analyze whether the tableau yielded automata of reasonable quality-in terms of the costs that would incur a model-checking procedure by using those automata as property monitors. Our automata were compared against automata taken from an online Büchi automata repository [14] . These selected automata correspond to the automata version of the LTL formula for the specification patterns proposed in [21] .
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Background section presents the standing features of FVS and some Büchi automata definitions and properties. FVS formal syntax and semantics' are presented in Sect. 3. Section 4 introduces x-FVS and explains its semantics under the presence of ''ghost'' events. Implications of handling x-regular properties are treated in Sect. 5, and the case studies are introduced in Sect. 6. Section 7 details the x-FVS synthesis procedure and exhibits the tableaux process translating x-FVS rules into Büchi automata whereas the experiment comparing automata's size is treated in Sect. 8. Section 9 presents some related work and Sect. 10 exhibits conclusions of the present paper and delineates future work. Finally, Appendix 1 shows the formal proof of a key lemma for the tableau algorithm and Appendix 2 exhibits the complete behavior of one of the case studies analyzed in this work.
Background
We now present some Büchi automata definitions and properties we will use through this paper, and briefly introduce main FVS features in Sect. 2.2.
Bü chi automata: definitions and properties
In this work, we rely on the traditional mathematical model of Büchi automata over infinite words where transitions are labeled with propositional formulas [13] . More formally, we consider a Büchi automaton as a 5-tuple B ¼ hR; S; S 0 ; D; Fi such that
• R is a finite alphabet.
• S is a finite set of states.
• S 0 S is a set of initial states.
• F S is a set of final states F.
• D S Â PLðRÞ Â S is the transition relationship, where PL is the set of propositional formulas that can be obtained from R.
A valuation is a total function v: R ! Bool, which assigns variables to boolean values. Given this, a run p of an automaton B is defined as a sequence p ¼ s 0 v 0 s 1 v 1 … of alternating states and valuations such that s 0 2 S 0^8 i (s i 2 S)^(9ðs i ; /; s iþ1 Þ 2 D^/ðv i Þ ¼ true). The sequence of valuations v 0 v 1 . . .v n in a run p constitutes a trace. We define Büchi automata semantics as described in [13] as follows. Let inf(p) be the set of states that appear infinitely often in the run p. An accepting run p is defined as follows: A run p of B over an infinite word is accepting if and only inf(p) \ F 6 ¼ ;, that is, when some accepting state appears in p infinitely often. We define the set of traces accepted by an automaton as follows. It is common when manipulating alphabets between automata that some variables need to be projected, hidden, or handled in a particular way. Given a certain alphabet R 0 R, we define the # R 0 operator to denote the projection of alphabet R over R 0 . In this context, the valuation function over R 0 , v # R 0 is a total function R 0 ! Boolean such that v # R 0 (e) = v(e) 8e 2 R 0 . The set of traces over R 0 for an automaton B can also be defined similarly.
Definition 2.2 (Projected automaton traces)
Given an automaton B with alphabet R and R 0 R, the set of traces for B over R 0 , denoted Tr(B) # R 0 , is defined as ft 0 j t 2 TrðBÞ^t 0 ¼ t # R 0 g.
We now define a projection operation between automata. 
As it can be seen, the projected automaton B# R 0 is almost identical to automaton B, excepting the alphabet (R 0 R), and the existential elimination process given in T4 manipulating the transition relation D. Note that A 0 ) 9t 1 ; t 2 … t n A is a quantified boolean formula [25] .
The following lemma relates the languages accepted by an automata B and its projection B# R 0 .
Lemma 2.1 Given an automaton B ¼ hR; S; S 0 ; D; Fi and its projection B # R 0 then Tr(B # R 0 ) = Tr(B) # R 0 . In other words, the projection of the traces accepted by B is exactly the language denoted by B # R 0 .
This lemma holds following the usual projection between traces.
Feather weight visual scenarios
In this section, we will informally describe the standing features of FVS [3] . A formal characterization of the language is presented later on in Sect. 3. FVS is a graphical language based on scenarios. Scenarios are partial order of events, consisting of points, which are labeled with the possible events occurring at that point, and arrows connecting them. An arrow between two points indicates precedence of the source with respect to the destination: for instance, in Fig. 1a A-event precedes B-event. We use an abbreviation for a frequent sub-pattern: A certain point represents the next occurrence of an event after another. The abbreviation is a second (open) arrow near the destination point. For example, in Fig. 1b Fig. 1c the scenario captures just the immediately previous A-event from B-event. Two distinguished points are introduced to denote the beginning and the end of the trace: a big full circle for begin, and two concentric circles for end (shown in Fig. 1d ). Events labeling an arrow are interpreted as forbidden events between both points. In Fig. 1e A-event precedes B-event such that C-event does not occur between them. Actually, next and precedence shortcuts previously explained in Fig. 1b , c can be codified using forbidden events as seen in Fig. 1f . Finally, FVS features aliasing between points. Scenario in Fig. 1g indicates that a point labeled with A is also labeled with A^B. It is worth noticing that A-event is repeated on the labeling of the second point just because of FVS formal syntaxis (see Sect. 3).
Protocol example
For a better comprehension of this section, we provide examples inspired in a small and simple protocol, where a server handles clients' requests trying to gain access to some resources. Resources may be locked, and security is addressed by requiring entering passwords. Scenario in Fig. 2 typifies a situation where three distinct events occur before an access is granted: an access request, a password confirmation, and then unlocked the resource status. Note that the scenario does not specify any special occurrence order between the request, password confirmation, and resource status. It is just requiring the three of them to occur, without imposing an special order of occurrence.
FVS rules
We now introduce the concept of Rule Scenario (RS) [3] or simply a rule, 1 a core concept in the language. Roughly speaking, a rule is divided into two parts: a scenario playing the role of an antecedent and at least one scenario playing the role of a consequent. The intuition is that whenever a trace ''matches'' a given antecedent scenario, then it must also match at least one of the consequents. In other words, rules take the form of an implication: an antecedent scenario and one or more consequent scenarios. The antecedent is a common substructure of all consequents, enabling complex relationship between points in antecedent and consequents: Our rules are not limited, like most triggered scenario notions, to feature antecedent as a pre-chart where events should precede consequent events. Thus, rules can state expected behavior happening in the past or in the middle of a bunch of events. Graphically, the antecedent is shown in black, and consequents in gray. Since a rule can feature more than one consequent, elements which do not belong to the antecedent scenario are numbered to identify the consequent they belong to. An example is shown in Fig. 3 . The interpretation of the rule is that, whenever an Access request event is followed by an Access granted event (without a logoff in between), one of two other event sequences must be observed too. One of them (consequent 1) requires that, after the access has been requested, a valid password is entered. The other one (consequent 2) allows for the case where a valid password has been entered before access to the resource is requested. Observe the power of our trigger notation, where the antecedent need not to precede the consequents in time. 
Anti-scenarios
In FVS, as in [1] , anti-scenarios can be automatically generated from rule scenarios. The complete procedure is detailed in [12] , but informally the algorithm computes all possible situations where the antecedent is found, but none of the consequents is matchable. Originally, anti-scenarios were proposed as the way to model check VTS [12] . As a by-product, anti-scenarios represents valuable information for the developer since it represents a sketch of how things could go wrong and violate the rule. One anti-scenario for the rule in Fig. 3 is shown in Fig. 4 . In this case, a valid password was not entered since the beginning of the trace and still access is granted.
FVS syntax and semantics
We now formally define FVS syntax and semantics to provide a complete definition of the language. FVS syntax and semantics using morphisms are inspired in the formalization described in [11] . To keep an homogenous notation in this work, we also define the notion of traces as one special type of FVS scenarios, introducing the concept of trace scenarios (Definition 3.5). Semantics of our notation is expressed using this concept in Definition 3.6. We introduce FVS syntax and semantics in the following way. First we introduce the formal definition of FVS scenarios. Next, we define a key operation between scenarios: morphisms, which allows the formal definitions of FVS rules. Finally, we define the formal semantics of FVS, by defining the notion of traces and rules satisfiability.
FVS syntax
An FVS scenario is described by the following definition.
Definition 3.1 (FVS scenario) An FVS scenario is a tuple hR; P; '; ; 6 ; \; ci, where: S1 R is a finite set of propositional variables standing for types of events; S2 P is a finite set of points; S3 ' : P ! PL(R) is a function that labels each point with a given formula; S4 P Â P is an equivalence relation; S5 6 P Â P is an asymmetric relation among points; S6 \ðP ] 0 f g Â P ] 1 f gÞnfh0; 1ig is a precedence relation between points, where 0 and 1 represent the beginning and the end of execution, respectively; S7 c : ð6 [\Þ ! PLðRÞ assigns to each pair of points, related by precedence or separation, a formula which constrains the set of events occurrences that may occur between the pair.
In few words, FVS scenarios consist of points that can be labeled with a formula describing the behavior occurring at the point. More precisely, PL is the set of propositional formulas that can be obtained from the alphabet R. Between points, the following relations and functions are defined. The equivalence relation is used to ''alias'' points. That is, points related by equivalence denote the same behavior. The 6 relation is used to separate points, whereas the precedence function is used to indicate the order of which the events occur. Finally function c is used to restrict behavior and satisfies the following condition: cðp; qÞ ) cðp; wÞ _ 'ðwÞ _ cðw; qÞ; 8p\w\q 2 P. This condition checks that the events assigned to a pair of points by this function logically implies any other event occurring between both points. That is, if event c occurs between events a and b, then : c cannot be included in cða; bÞ.
Morphisms
We now formally define morphisms between scenarios. Intuitively, we would like to obtain a matching between scenarios, i.e., a mapping between their points exhibiting how a scenario ''specializes'' another one [11] . Definition 3.2 (Morphism) Given two scenarios S 1 ; S 2 (assuming a common universe of event propositions), and f a total function between P 1 and P 2 we say that f is a morphism from S 1 to S 2 (denoted f : S 1 ! S 2 ) iff M1 ' 2 ðaÞ ) ' 1 ðpÞ is a tautology for all p 2 P 1 and all a 2 P 2 such that a 2 f ðpÞ; M2 c 2 ðf ðpÞ; f ðqÞÞ ) c 1 ðp; qÞ is a tautology for all p; q 2 P 1 ; M3 if p 1 q then f ðpÞ 2 f ðqÞ for all p; q 2 P 1 ; M4 if p 6 1 q then f ðpÞ 6 2 f ðqÞ for all p; q 2 P 1 ; M5 if p\ 1 q then f ðpÞ\ 2 f ðqÞ for all p; q 2 P 1 . We say that S 2 features more constraints than S 1 when there exists a morphism m : S 1 ! S 2 . This relation between two scenarios establishes that S 1 is embedded into S 2 if the latter features more constraints (this is analogous to a logical subsumption). Analogously, we say, in this case, that S 2 specializes S 1 . Figure 5 illustrates a morphism example (shown in dotted arrows) from scenario S 1 to scenario S 2 . The scenario in the top of the figure (scenario S 2 ) shows a sequence of requests and responses but also taking into account events reflecting the resource's status (locked or unlocked). On the other hand, the scenario in the bottom of the figure (scenario S 1 ) shows only a client's request followed by a server's response. It can be noted that scenario S 2 features more constraints since it considers the resource's status. In particular, considering the given morphism's definition is satisfied that Client1 Access request ) Client1 Access request and that Resource unlockedÂ ccess granted ) Access granted are tautologies.
Access granted

FVS rules
FVS rules model the expected behavior of the system, enabling a very rich, flexible, and powerful mechanism to predicate and reason about systems' behavior. As it was said before, a rule structure is divided into two parts: a scenario playing the role of an antecedent and, at least, one scenario playing the role of a consequent. Whenever the antecedent is matched (i.e., a morphism f exists), f should be extensible to show a matching of a consequent scenario (i.e., at least one of the consequents is matched too). The formal definition is given below.
Definition 3.3 (FVS Rule) Given a scenario S 0 (antecedent) and an indexed set of scenarios and morphisms from the antecedent f 1 :
As an example, consider the following rules in Fig. 6 modeling a portion of the expected behavior of the protocol introduced before. The rule in Fig. 6a says that every request will be eventually granted. Similarly, rule in Fig. 6b basically says that whenever an event RequestGranted occurs, an event ClientRequest occurred in the past. That is, every RequestGranted event must be preceded by a client's request. Finally, rule in Fig. 6c says that is not possible for Client1 to raise two consecutive requests without the occurrence of a request from Client2. That is, between two consecutive requests from Client1 there must exist a request from Client2, indicating a request's alternation between clients. These rules represent possible instantiations of some specification patterns [22] : the Response pattern (Fig. 6a) , the Precedence pattern (Fig. 6b) , and the Existence pattern (Fig. 6c) [22] .
In the next section, FVS semantics is fully described. 
FVS semantics
Defining FVS semantics implies defining when a trace satisfies a given set of FVS rules. In order to achieve this goal, we need to walk through the following steps:
1. Establish when a scenario satisfies a given rule 2. Define traces as scenarios 3. Establish when a trace satisfies a given set of rules Semantics can be formalized using the notion of morphisms. The following definition establishes when a certain scenario S fulfills an FVS rule R (achieving step one): Semantics is illustrated in Fig. 7 . The scenario (in the top of the picture) satisfies the rule (in the lower part of the picture), since whenever a Client Access request event is found in the scenario, i.e., whenever a morphism exists from the antecedent of the rule to the given scenario (in the case of Fig. 7 there are two: m1 and m2), an Access granted event occurring afterwards is also found. Formally, for m1 morphisms {m1, m3} is a possible morphism from consequent scenario to target scenario such that they extend m1 (i.e., it commutes as required by the previous definition). Analogously, {m2, m4} is a possible extension of m2.
The following steps (steps two and three) involves dealing with traces. Traces must be properly defined as well as their relationship with scenarios and rules satisfiability. As said, FVS semantics will be given by obtaining the set of valid traces of a system: those traces satisfying the set of rules describing the system's behavior.
Trace-based semantics
As said, traces model the abstract outcome of an eventbased system. To keep our framework homogenous, traces are understood as particular scenarios in the following way. Precedence in trace scenarios are total orders, and ' function explicitly specifies the presence or absence of each possible event in each point of the trace, returning a minterm (a conjunctive clause where event propositions appear only once, either complemented or uncomplemented) over the set of available events. Definition 3.5 (Trace scenarios) A trace scenario S r is a scenario hR r ; P r ; ' r ; r ; 6 r ; \ r ; c r i where:
T1 P r and \ r fulfill that 9 a bijective index: N ! P r such that index(i) \ r index(j) iff i \ j; T2 ' r ðpÞ yields a minterm over R r for all p 2 P r ; T3 c r ðp; qÞ ¼ false if there is no w such that p\ r w\ r q; T4 p r q if and only if p ¼ q, for all p; q 2 P r .
Finally, the following definition provides the semantics of our language (step three). The semantics of a set of rules R is the set of all traces that satisfy R. Formally: Definition 3.6 (Trace scenarios' semantics) A trace scenario S r satisfies a set of rules R iff 8 r 2 RS r r.
Note that traces scenarios can be injectively mapped into traces as defined in Sect. 2.1 as follows.
Definition 3.7 (Linking automaton traces with trace scenarios) Given an automaton trace p, we proceed with the following mapping to a trace scenario S r :
• R r ¼ R, • P r ¼ N, the set of natural numbers, • ' r ðiÞ ¼ DðiÞ, where DðiÞ is interpreted as a minterm that features the proposition p when DðiÞðpÞ = true and : p if DðiÞðpÞ = false. That is, each point will be labeled according to its valuation in D • r ¼ id N , the identity relation over natural numbers • 6 r ¼6 N , the inequality relation over natural numbers • \ r ¼ \ N , the \ relation between natural numbers • 8ic r ði; i þ 1Þ ¼ false, indicating that there exist no points between two consecutive indexes in the trace scenario.
Similarly, it is trivial to see that there also exists a mapping embedding trace scenarios into automata traces. Given these injective mappings, we will use the terms trace scenarios and traces interchangeably in the next sections.
x-FVS
In this section we present x-FVS, explaining how FVS expressive power can be easily increased to deal with xregular properties, broadening the nature of the behavior that the specifier can predicate about. The shift in the expressive power is due to the introduction of abstraction, which is incorporated in our notation by introducing a new type of events. By using these events, the specifier can abstract behavior and reason about events that are not present in the system traces, but actually represent a higher level of abstraction. We call these special events as ''ghost'' events, in contrast to ''actual'' events, the set of events present in the system's specification. In this way, x-FVS scenarios will be compound of ghost and actual events. More formally, an x-FVS scenario will consist of a tuple hR; P; '; ; 6 ; \; ci, just like an FVS scenario with the distinction that now R ¼ R a ] R g , where R g defines ghost events and R a defines actual events. To ease the formal manipulation of both kind of events, we introduce a simple operator # R a to specify that the actual events are those defined in R a , where R a R and R g ¼ R À R a are interpreted as ''ghost'' events. For example, an x-FVS rule r denoted as r # R a indicates that the actual events of the rule are those in R a . In this way, ghost events are implicitly defined as those events in R À R a .
x-FVS semantics is defined in very similar way than FVS semantics, but taking into consideration that system's traces do not hold ghost events. First of all, we define an operation to establish when an x-FVS scenario holding ghost events can be projected into an system trace (recall that system traces features only actual events). The idea behind this operation is to discard ghosts events through a classic process of existential elimination. With this operation in mind, it is easy to define when a system trace satisfies a rule or set of rules which predicate about actual and ghost events and therefore establish x-FVS semantics.
Projection morphism
Projection morphism is a key operation which handles the gap between the levels of abstraction introduced by ghost events. In a few words, this operation establishes when a x-FVS scenario holding ghost events can be projected into a system trace. Note that this projection is analogous to a standard trace projection, where variables not included in alphabet are eliminated. Definition 4.1 (Projection morphism) Given a trace scenario S r hR r ; P r ; ' r ; r ; 6 r ; \ r ; c r i, an x-FVS scenario ShR; P; '; ; 6 ; \; ci and events R a R (assuming a common universe of event propositions and labels), and g a total function between P and P r we say that g is a projection morphism from S to S r for R a (denoted g : S ! S r ) iff:
M1 Rr ¼ R a and ghosts events R g ¼ R À Rr M2 ' r ðgðpÞÞ ) 9t 1 ; t 2 . . .t n 'ðpÞ is a tautology for all p 2 P where R g ¼ ft 1 ; t 2 . . .t n g M3 c r ðgðpÞ; gðqÞÞ ) 9t 1 ; t 2 . . .t n cðp; qÞ is a tautology for all p; q 2 P where R g ¼ ft 1 ; t 2 . . .t n g M4 if p q then gðpÞ r gðqÞ for all p; q 2 P M5 if p 6 q then gðpÞ 6 r gðqÞ for all p; q 2 P M6 if p\q then gðpÞ\ r gðqÞ for all p; q 2 P.
This definition is very similar to the morphism operation previously defined (see Definition 3.2), with the addition of two extra conditions managing the existential elimination of ghost events (M2 and M3). Finally, the following definition provides the desired semantics. The semantics of a set of rules R is the set of all system traces that satisfy R. Formally: Definition 4.2 (Trace-semantics of a x-FVS rule set) A trace scenario S r satisfies a set of rules R # R a iff: there exists a scenario S such that: 8 r 2 R S r and 9g, a projection morphism g : S ! S r for R a .
In other words, a trace will satisfy a set of rules if there exists a scenario that can be projected into the trace and that satisfy all the rules in the set.
A brief example: lighting system
We now present a small example based on the lighting system introduced in [37] . Consider an embedded software for a vehicle lighting system that controls the interior lights of an automobile. Basically, the system is in charge of turning on the interior lights when a door is opened as well as turning off the interior lights when all the doors are closed, based on the status of the doors, door locks, and power switch. A possible set of available events includes events such as PowerOn, PowerOff, LightsOn, LightsOff, DoorOpened, DoorClosed, DoorLocked, and DoorUnlocked.
Suppose now that some issues arise about how the interior light behavior affects the car's battery status, especially when the lights are turned on but the power is off. In these cases, it can be said that the battery works in an ''expensive'' mode. In this context, it might be the case that the specifier would like to introduce a new property to restrict the use of the battery in this expensive way. For example, a property requiring that between two consecutive periods of expensive use the car power is turned on so that the battery is recharged.
However, this expensive mode does not belong in the system's vocabulary. That is, it is not an event included in the system specification. So the specifier is forced to adapt the notion of expensive mode in terms of these events, which is an error-prone process. The property is difficult to write, and once written, is hard to establish whether it is expressing the desired behavior. In other words, validation became an intricate procedure.
This kind of properties can be stated in x-FVS using ghost events. A ghost event ''Expensive'' is introduced, capturing the initial point when the battery starts working harder. This happens every time when the lights are turned on, while the power is off. This is illustrated in the first scenario in Fig. 8 . Similarly, when the lights are turned on while the power is on occurs the ghost event ''Not Expensive.'' Once these ghost events have been defined, the desired property can be stated on the top of them, as shown in the last rule in Fig. 8 .
To illustrate how projection morphism works, consider Fig. 9 . The figure shows a system trace S r (in the upper part), and a scenario S in the lower part, which includes the ghost event ''Expensive.'' That is, R ¼ R a ] R g , where R a ¼ fPowerOff ; LightsONg and R g ¼ fExpensiveg. The projection morphism from S to S r is shown in dotted arrows. Considering the projection morphism definition we see that Rr ¼ R a ¼ fPowerOff ; LightsONg and all the others conditions are met. In particular for the existential elimination process for M2, we obtain that LightsOn ) 9Expensive LighstOn^Expensive is a tautology by considering Expensive ¼ true. More simply, PowerOff ) PowerOff is also a tautology. Since all the conditions are satisfied, the given trace can be projected into the scenario. That is, it exists g, a projection morphism from S to S r . What is more, S satisfies r1, the first rule in Fig. 8 . Therefore, since S r1 and exists g, a projection morphism from S to S r , we can conclude that S r r1.
On the expressive power of x-FVS
In order to analyze the expressive power of x-FVS we proceed as follows. We first show how x-FVS can represent any x-regular language in Sect. 5.1. After that, Sect. 5.2 shows how x-FVS can specify behavior beyond LTL expressive power. In addition, the case studies analyzed in Sect. 6 illustrate the expressive power of x-FVS in action within the context of software communication protocols.
Representing x-regular languages
The aim of this section is to sketch how x-FVS can represent any x-regular language by encoding an arbitrary Büchi automaton with a set of x-FVS rules. Roughly speaking, given a Büchi automaton B it is possible to build a set of x-FVS rules where ghosts events are used to represent the entry or exit for each state of B. That is, for any given state S of B there will exist ghost events ''Sentered'' and ''S-exited.'' On the top of these ghost events x-FVS rules can be defined to indicate when and how a state can be entered or exited according to the transition relation specified by the automaton. Finally, rules are introduced to model acceptance conditions. More precisely, x-FVS rules will state that ghosts event indicating that an accepting state is entered occur in any trace and also that every time an accepting state is exited, and then in the future the trace exhibits again a ghost event indicating that an accepting state is entered.
A sketch based on a fragment of a given Büchi automaton B (shown in Fig. 10 ) is presented next, where the final objective is to define x-FVS rules that mimic the behavior of B.
For simplicity reasons, we are just presenting mostly rules for entering and exiting state S1, and rules modeling the acceptance conditions. Similar rules can be defined for the other states and transitions. These rules are shown in Fig. 11 . Rule 1 models the change of state from S1 to state S2 or S4 when an event of type a occurs, as described in the output transitions from S1 labeled with a in Fig. 10 (very similar rules can be added when an event of type b occurs).
If an event of type a occurs, then state S1 is exited, and the automaton may enter state S2, shown in consequent 1, or into state S4, shown in consequent 2. How rules can be used to specify how and when a state is entered or exited is shown in rules 2 and 3. Rule 2 specifies a valid context for entering state S2: the previous state must have been S1 and a event of type a occurred. Similarly, rule 3 details proper behavior for exiting state S1 (the automata must be in state S1 and either an event of type a or b occurred).
Finally, rules 4 and 5 deal with acceptance conditions as mentioned previously, considering as accepting states the set {S3, S4}. In particular, rule 4 states that an accepting state (either S3 or S4 ) is reached from the begin of the execution, and rule 5 specifies the behavior when accepting state S3 is exited: either in the future an accepting state is entered (consequent 1 and 2), or the automata loops in S3 (consequent 4) or it moves immediately to state S4 (consequent 3). Note that not all these consequents are topologically possible according to the automata in Fig. 10 , but they are still shown in Fig. 11 for the sake of generality exhibiting all the consequents that would be build.
The rules built are such that the accepting runs of B are the set of trace scenarios satisfying those rules. More precisely, any accepting run of B can be embedded into a trace scenario satisfying the rules as explained in Definition 3.7.
Analogously, any trace scenario satisfying the rule can be embedded into an accepting run of B.
Beyond LTL expressive power
As said, ghosts events do not constitute merely a syntactic shorthand but actually do add expressive power to the language. Consider for example a property like: ''p must occur in every even step.'' These types of properties are not expressible in LTL and are known as ''LTL cannot count'' [45, 58] . In x-FVS ghost events can be used to ''count.'' For the mentioned property, a ghost event ''Even'' is introduced to register if the number of steps is even or not. Odd steps will be represented by the boolean formula ''Not (Even).'' Rules in Fig. 12 provide a definition for step events' parity. The very first appearance of an step event is marked as ''Not (Even).'' From that instant, successive appearances of an step event will be appropriately marked as ''Even'' or ''Not (Even).'' Given this definition, the desired property, which predicates about even occurrences, can be specified on the top 
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Defining even occurrences of the step event of ghost events as seen in Fig. 13 . It establishes that p must occur in every even step.
Case studies
We performed three case studies to analyze different aspects of x-FVS. The main points to be covered were (a) x-FVS's ability to declaratively specify industrial-relevant systems; (b) the use of ghost events; (c) integration of declarative and operational notations and (d) a potential use of the tableau algorithm (described in Sect. 7), which translates x-FVS rules into Büchi automata. To achieve these goals, we selected three representative examples of event-based specifications: the SMB2 Protocol [57] , the Phillips Audio Protocol [9] , and the .NET NegotiateStream Protocol [36] . The following subsections introduce each example in detail.
SMB2 protocol
The SMB2 protocol is a well-known mechanism for file sharing between Windows platforms. The objectives for this case study were to illustrate the power of ghost events and to declaratively specify the behavior of a relevant industrial protocol in a incremental fashion. In this sense, we analyzed the fragment of the protocol illustrated in [57] . This protocol is a successor of the Windows file-sharing client-server protocol SMB, which is used for file sharing between Vista machines and future Windows hosts. In few words, the client sends requests to the server, which responses back. The selected features of the protocol to be modeled are representative from the point of view of complexity and size [57] . Those features are: credit negotiation and cancelation of previously sent requests.
We modeled credit negotiation in a incremental shape. We started from a naive implementation just considering clients sending and canceling requests, and then we built on the top of this version a more complex one, considering a credit negotiation scheme based on a sliding window algorithm. Finally, we added a new rule to avoid clients starvation.
In the initial version of the protocol, the events involved are: request (a request is sent), response (the server responses), and cancel (the client cancels a previously sent request). Under these scheme, the requirements involved are:
• R1: Every request must be followed by a response, unless a cancelation is issued.
• R2: Cancelation can be applied only on pending requests.
The rules in Fig. 14 illustrate the behavior of these requirements. Requirement R1 is addressed in the rule on the left side, whereas R2 is covered with the rule on the right side. Note that these rules do not preclude cancelation from the arrival of the response. Suppose now that the request/response behavior is now upgraded to a sliding window algorithm. The client can ask for credits in the requests that it sends to the server, in order to expand the window. The server may grant credits in its responses to the client. The number of credits granted in a response determines how the window grows or shrinks as time progresses. We abstract the notion of the sliding window by considering only the amount of credits. That is, the client can send as many requests as credits he has. In each response, the server may grant the client more credits. Each time when she sends a request, the amount of credits diminishes by one. Considering only a simple case with only two credits to be handled, the response event is now replaced with two events: responseGrant1 (the server response granting one credit) and responseGrant2 (the server response granting two credits). In order to model credits behavior, we introduce the following ghosts events: credit0, credit1 and credit2, each one representing the different amounts of credits the client may have in a given moment. Finally, event Init stands for the beginning of the protocol.
Rules in Fig. 15 model the upgraded behavior according to the following requirements:
R3: Clients are given one credit at the beginning of the protocol R4: Requests can only occur if the client has one or two credits. This requirement implies that no requests are sent if the client has zero credits.
R5: Client's credits diminish by one each time when a request is sent.
R6: Client's credits augment only by the amount of credits granted by the server.
This requirement follows the following intuition. If a response with one credit is given and as a result the client has now n credits, then it must be the case that the client
Step and Even and p held previouslyn-1credits. For simplicity, it is considered only the case where the server grants one credit (very similar scenarios can be defined for those cases when two or zero credits are granted). Finally, Fig. 16 deals with a classical problem in distributed protocols, which is starvation. In this protocol, starvation occurs when the client gets zero credits and has no chance of receiving any more credits in the future. In order to avoid starvation, a new requirement R7 is introduced: if the client sends a request and as a result she runs off of credits, then she will eventually get more credits in the future.
It is interesting noting that this rule eliminates those traces that response granting zero credits to a client that has zero credits and no pending requests. This behavior is implied by the rules, whereas in [57] the property is explicitly added to the model after being detected this unwanted behavior.
Philips audio protocol
Roughly speaking, the Philips audio protocol is composed of a sender and a receiver connected through a wire, where bit streams are sent using Manchester encoding. The main objective of this case study was to integrate operational specifications into the declarative framework. In this case, we chose to work with some features of the Philips audio protocol [9] . This example was also studied in [10] , where a particular property of the protocol is modeled. In this section, we show how we specified the very same property combining x-FVS capacity to specify behavior directly from the natural language description of the requirements with x-FVS ability to mimic automata behavior. In what follows, the protocol is described and then the property is specified in x-FVS.
The Manchester encoding is achieved as follows. A ''1'' is sent by raising the voltage in the middle of the bit slot, whereas sending a ''0'' is just the reverse: The voltage is up during the first half of the slot and low in the second one. These variations of the voltage are modeled by the events up and down. Similarly, events in and out model, respectively, the request to transmit a bit stream and the corresponding output. Like [9, 10] we assume that whenever an action in happens before the action out corresponding to the previous message, the protocol moves to a chaotic state where any behavior is allowed. This implies that the behavior to be specified is valid only when the protocol is working in a non-chaotic mode.
As it was mentioned before, in the same way than [10] we only focus in one of the properties the protocol is required to satisfy: the received bit stream is equal to the one sent, provided the protocol is not in a chaotic state. To fulfill this property two conditions must hold. First, whenever the receiver produces an out in a non-chaotic state then necessarily an in occurred in the past when the sender started transmitting the bit stream. And second, since the last occurrence of in, the system must have transmitted correctly the bit stream according to the Manchester encoding. Both conditions are tackled in [10] using a temporal logic called BTATL p , which combines temporal logics with automata constraints. To show x-FVS versatility we will model the first condition using rules to specify directly the requirements from the natural language description. Next, the second condition will be addressed by introducing rules and ghost events to mimic the automata behavior given in [10] . Finally, both conditions are combined to tackle the desired property.
To capture chaotic and non-chaotic modes, we introduce the chaotic ghost event. Each occurrence of in and out events will be tagged with chaotic or Not (chaotic)
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1 Fig. 15 Rules for the sliding window upgrade request and credit0 credit1 or credit2 1 1 Not (credit1 or credit2) Fig. 16 Handling starvation issues in the sliding window protocol according to the behavior specified in the requirements. As it was said before, the protocol enters a chaotic state when two consecutive in events occur without an occurrence of an out event in between and viceversa. Rules in Fig. 17 define chaotic mode regarding in events, whereas rules in Fig. 18 do the same work but taking into account out events. As it can be seen in Fig. 17 , the very first occurrence of the in event will be tagged as Not (Chaotic). The next occurrences of the in event will be tagged with chaotic or Not (Chaotic) depending on whether an out event occurs between them or not.
On the other hand, rules in Fig. 18 consider out event. Its first occurrence will be tagged as chaotic or Not (chaotic) depending on the presence of a prior occurrence of an in event in the trace. In a similar way, following occurrences of the out event are classified as chaotic or Not (chaotic).
Modeling the behavior of a proper transmission according to the Manchester encoding implies ensuring that the bit stream has been sent using Manchester encoding and that it has been correctly received. This behavior is modeled in [10] with the automaton shown in Fig. 19 . We now briefly explain the automata behavior, while the reader is referred to [10] for a complete description. The labeling of each state S i must be interpreted as the set of events that must occur simultaneously. A clock is used to measure the time elapsed since the last change of voltage of the wire, represented by the events clock2 (two units time), clock4 (four units time), and clock5 (five units time). Events sen0, sen1, rec0, rec1, and rec01 stand for the sending and receipt of ''1s'' and ''0''s of the sender and the receiver involved. To mention one example of the automata behavior, if the automata are in state S1 and a down event occurs after four times units since the last change of voltage then the automata moves to state S2 and a ''0'' is send through the wire, represented by the occurrence of event rec0.
As explained in the beginning of this section, the presence of ghost events allows x-FVS to mimic the behavior of any Büchi automaton. Figure 20 exhibits rules modeling part the behavior of the automaton in Fig. 19 , focusing mostly on state S2.
For simplicity reasons, we use the notation S i Labeling to denote the labeling of each state. For example, the S2 Labeling stands for the simultaneous occurrence of the events sen0 and down0. Non-chaotic mode is guaranteed by the rules since this restriction is present in every rule representing a change of state in the automaton. Rules 1 and 2 describe transitions from states S1 and S4 to state S2, rules 3 and 4 reflect conditions for entering state S2, whereas rule 5 describes conditions for exiting S2.
Once non-chaotic mode and correct transmissions have been characterized the desired property can be defined as shown in Fig. 21 . Basically it says that every occurrence of an in event in a non-chaotic state must be followed by a correct transmission. This is reflected in the first rule in Fig. 21 including the S1 entered event in the consequent of the rule. Once in the initial state rules in Fig. 20 assure that a correct transmission is received. The second rule establishes that every out event in a non-chaotic mode must be preceded in the trace by an in event in a nonchaotic mode. 
MS-NNS: .NET NegotiateStream protocol example
The MS-NNS protocol [36] was introduced as a lightweight protocol to provide authenticated and confidential communication between a server and a client over a TCP connection. This case study pursued two objectives: for one side, to obtain a declarative specification following a existing documentation of a protocol with industrial strength (version 2.0) [36]; on the other side, to demonstrate a potential use of the operational specification automatically generated by the tableau (to be latter described in Sect. 7). As it was said before, the case study chosen was a Microsoft protocol specification: the MS-NNS (.NET NegotiateStream) protocol. A key benefit of this protocol is that authentication is achieved without the use of digital certificates, as it is required by the Transport Security Layer (TSL) protocol. Instead, in MS-NNS the client and server exchange security tokens using a well-known security api: the Simple and Protected Generic Security Service Application Interface (GSS-API) [33] . Once the authentication and security levels negation conclude, the protocol enters a data transfer phase, in which actual data are transmitted according to the negotiated standards.
Basically, the behavior of the protocol is as follows. The negotiation phase starts with the client sending a security token to the server including a requested security level, such as the degree of encryption to be used. The server process this token and send back an answer to the client, which processes it and sends back another token. This cycle is repeated while the token they send each other is a continuation token, indicating that the negotiation phase still needs issues to be settled. This phase either concludes with an agreement, indicated by sending an agreement token, or when an error message is sent by any of the participants. If the negotiation phase succeeds, data are finally transmitted. As expected, the data transfer phase can also result in an error, in which case the communication is usually terminated.
The steps involved to meet this case study's objectives were the following. First, we modeled using x-FVS the specification of the protocol. It is worth mentioning that the protocol specification document is structured natural language description containing two auxiliary state machines (one describing the client behavior and the other for the server behavior). The specification states that the natural language description is to be considered the normative specification of the protocol, while the state machines are simply aids and reference for the reader. The second step included the translation of the x-FVS rules into Büchi automata using the tableau procedure to be described in Sect. 7. The analysis performed over the automata generated by the tableau allowed the detection of discrepancies between the textual specification and the state machine provided as a visual reference.
MS-NNS: a declarative specification using x-FVS
The behavior of the MS-NNS was declarative specified through x-FVS rules using as a guide a real structured natural language specification of the protocol [36] . In this section, we show some x-FVS rules corresponding to the behavior of the client, whereas the complete specification of the client and the server can be found in Appendix 2.
The MS-NNS protocol behavior is described in terms of virtual states. This is done is section 3. WaitingforHandshakeDone, Authenticated and Closed. Entering a certain state of the stream can be modeled as an abstract event, so these values were modeled in x-FVS as ghost events. That is, for each possible stream state value S, we introduce a ghost event S_entered. Since these ghost events are mutually exclusive, we introduce rules to address this condition (see Sect. 5). Note that there is no actual need to introduce ghosts events representing the exit of a node, and we use an alternative way to model state transitions to the one mentioned in Sect. 5.
On the other hand, the actual events include the exchanged responses with the other endpoints or the GSS-API(GSS_S_Continue_Needed, GSS_S_Complete, HandshakeDone, HandshakeInProgess, ERROR), invocation of the application (ApplicationInvocation), data transmission (SendData, ReceiveData), and the end the communication (Close). Under these considerations, we now present some rules covering different stages of the communication. These rules model requirements extracted from the protocol structured natural language specification.
In what follows we describe a portion of the client behavior, whereas the complete specification of the client (and also the server) can be found in Appendix 2. The behavior described here includes the following sections of the specification document
We start with two requirements which belong to the Application Invocation of the .NET NegotiateStreamProtocol stage:
• R1: If an application invocation is received when the stream state is not equal to Unitialized, an error must be returned to the application.
• R2: If the function returns GSS_S_Complete, the implementation must set the stream state to CreatingSecurityToken.
The rules in Fig. 22 model these requirements. We use the event AnyOtherStreamState to represent the disjunction of all the others state events apart from the ghost event mentioned in the rule. For the rules in Fig. 22 , the event AnyOtherStreamState its representing any other state than Uninitialized. More concretely, the rule at the top of the figure addresses requirement R1, specifying that an ERROR event should occur if the application is invoked in an invalid state. The rule at the bottom of the figure tackles requirement R2. When the GSS-API returns the GSS_S_Complete value, the stream enters the CreatingSecurityToken state. Similar to requirement R1, requirement R3 says the data transmission can only start while the stream state is in the authenticated state. This requirement belongs to the Application Request to Send Data stage and it is shown in Fig. 23: • R3: If the application requests data to be transferred while not in the Authenticated state, an error must be returned.
The followings requirements deal with the message processing events and sequencing rules, while the stream state is CreatingSecurityToken, as detailed in section 3.1.5.1 of the specification document. In this case, the GSS-API returns any of three possible outcomes: 
GSS_S_Complete to indicate the end of the negotiation, GSS_S_Continue_Needed to indicate that further negotiation is needed, or ERROR to report that an error has occurred. The rule in the top of Fig. 24 describes these assumptions. Requirements R4, R5 and R6 handle the expected behavior for any possible outcome value.
• R4: If the GSS_Init_sec_context returns a status of GSS_S_Complete, the stream state must be set to WaitingForHandshakeDone.
• R5: If the GSS_Init_sec_context returns a status of GSS_S_Continue_Needed, the stream state must be set to WaitingForHandshakeMessage.
• R6: If the GSS_Init_sec_context returns a status of ERROR, the stream state must be set to Uninitialized. Fig. 24 model requirements R4, R5 and R6. The first rule describes the possible outcomes using three different consequents (one for each option), and the rules below that one reflect the expected change of state. Finally, we model two more requirements extracted from section 3.1.5.4, focused on the WaitingForHandshakeDone state of the specification document. These two requirements (requirements R7 and R8) involve the end of the negotiation, either because a HandshakeDone event has been received (indicating that the negotiation is over and data transmission can begun) or because an error has occurred.
Rules in
• R7: If the message has a handshakeId of HandshakeDone, the stream state must be set to Authenticated.
• R8: If the message has a handshakeId of ERROR, the stream must be set to Closed. Fig. 25 reflect the expected behavior denoted in requirements R7 and R8.
Detecting bugs using the tableau procedure
To achieve the last objective of this case study, we translated the x-FVS rules exhibiting the expected behavior of the protocol (using the tableau procedure described in Sect. 7) into Büchi automata. By composing each of the generated automaton, we obtained a final automaton Fig. 24 Rules modeling section 3.1.5.1 of the specification document reflecting the behavior of the client. A simplified version of this automaton is shown in Fig. 26 . This version does not show accepting states. In addition, in order to favor readability, ghosts events are shown in italics, while actual events are not.
The inspection of the obtained client automaton and comparison against the auxiliary client-side state machine of the protocol specification documentation helped find some discrepancies between the textual specification and the state machine notation. According to the state-machine description, whenever the client receives or sends an error, it goes to a state in which it waits for a message from the server. However, in the automaton we obtain the client either terminate the connection or retry the whole phase. These errors were subsequently corrected in version 3.0 of the document. This illustrates that these errors were relevant enough to 
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Closed-entered warrant correction. Additionally, we also note that in the state-machine description of the client in the current specification document there are missing several transitions to the Closed state, since a request to close the stream can be issued at any moment, according to the textual specification of the document. If we assume these transitions to be present in the actual version of the state-machine notation describing the client behavior, we can observe that it accepts the same language than the automaton we generated upon the x-FVS rules for the client.
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Conclusions
In summary, using x-FVS we were able to obtain a declarative specification from an industrial strength document. In addition, the automaton obtained through the tableau procedure helped to find significant errors in the specification document, which were solved in a revised version of the document [36].
From x-FVS to Bü chi automata
In this section, we describe a synthesis algorithm that translates rules into Büchi automata. The approach can be intuitively described as follows. Suppose we have a rule describing the behavior of a system. Applying the tableau algorithm to be described in Sect. 6.2, the rule is translated into a Büchi automaton without distinguishing ghost events (that is, ''forgetting'' ghosts events). Later on, existential elimination is applied to the generated automaton to discard ghosts events, as seen in Definition 2.3. When dealing with a set of rules instead of a single one, the automata generated from each rule are composed, and then existential elimination is applied to this resulting automaton. In either case, the final automaton is such that it accepts those trace scenarios satisfying the rule. This is further explained in section 6.4, when describing the end-to-end translation approach. The rest of this section is organized as follows. After introducing some introductory definitions, the tableau algorithm is presented in Sect. 6.2. Section 6.3 presents an sketch of the correctness proof of the tableau procedure, and finally, section 6.4 discusses the end-to-end synthesis approach.
Definitions
In order to describe the tableau construction, we need to introduce some definitions. A configuration h of a scenario S is a subset of P ] 1 f g such that h is left-closed under the relation \[ . Later we will weaken this to be leftclosed for only a subset of points. Given a morphism e : A 0 ! A, we will say that a scenario A 0 is a configuration of A if and only if eðA 0 Þ is a configuration of A. Intuitively, A 0 represents a partial instantiation of scenario A.
F P is a single step of a configuration h by a minterm
(8p 2 F À f1gÞA ) 'ðpÞ is a tautology. In other words, a step in a configuration stands for a progress in the matching of the scenario. We define the set of active event restriction for a configuration h, AR(h) as follows. hp; qi 2 AR(h) if and only if p 2 h and q 6 2 h. We call sðhÞ ¼ V cðp; qÞ for all hp; qi 2 ARðhÞ and RðhÞ to those minterms m over R such that mŝ ðhÞ is satisfiable. Furthermore, the set of strictly active restrictions for a configuration h with respect a set of points F is defined as SAR(h; F ) = {hp; qi 2 ARðhÞ^q 6 2 F}. We call n F ðhÞ ¼ V cðp; qÞ for all hp; qi 2 SARðh; F Þ. We define the set of strictly active formulas R F ðhÞ to those minterms m over R such that m^n F ðhÞ is satisfiable. All these restrictions establish valid advances for configurations.
We now define the notion of situation, a concept that represents for a given rule possible combinations of partial matches from the antecedent to each consequent.
Definition 7.1 (Situation) Given
• f j : A ! C j ; j 2 ½1::n, standing for a rule with antecedent A and consequents C 1 ; C 2 ; . . .; C n . Consider the following example in Fig. 27 . In this case, a rule with two consequents is shown. Furthermore, there are three partial matches for consequent one, and two for consequent two. Therefore, g 1 consists of the three morphisms in the first column (g . On the top of these definitions, the following subsection presents the synthesis algorithm, describing a tableau procedure which translates an x-FVS rule into an Büchi automata.
Tableau construction
Given a rule R, the tableau constructs a Büchi Automaton B ¼ hR; S; S 0 ; D; Fi such that R constitutes minterms over R R and the set of states S are triples (! R Â Bool Â PLðR R ÞÞ. The set ! R associated with a state (a set of situations g), denoted situations(S), symbolically represents all the possible combination of partial matches obtained up to that state from the antecedent to each consequent. The second term of the triple identifies accepting states. This boolean variable is set to true when the pattern is completely matched and will make the state transient. Finally, a third element is needed to maintain future obligations of the trace. These formulas are needed when rules predicate about conditions that must hold until the end of the trace.
The pseudo-code sketched in Algorithm 1 computes the successor states for transition relation D. Starting from the initial state (h;; false; truei), the automata will try to incrementally ''construct'' the pattern as events, represented by minterms, occur. For every minterm, Algorithm 1 computes all possible matchings considering matchings in the antecedent and also in each consequent. This is obtained trough two auxiliary algorithms, advanceAntecedent (line 5) and advanceConsequent (line 6).
Line 7 analyzes whether any successor reaches a trap situation, a situation where the antecedent has been matched (a morphism such that A 0 ¼ A), but matching for all consequents is known unfeasible (C i j it is not a configuration of consequent C j ).
Lines 8 and 9 check whether any consequent has been matched by the last move. This is, goalmatched½i ¼ true if and only if consequentC i is matched.
Line 10 analyzes whether the next state is an accepting state: a consequent has been matched and it is not a trap situation.
Finally, line 11 returns the expected output. Those consequents holding restriction against 1 deserves an special treatment. Consider for example a property reasoning about the last occurrence of a certain event. This consequent has a restriction against 1 saying that the event will not occur again. When this event occurs, the algorithm does not know whether that was the last occurrence of the event or whether the event will occur again. This is solved due to non-determinism. One state will consider that event as the last one, introducing a restriction against 1, whereas a second state will be open to the possibility of a new occurrence of that event. In other words, in those cases where a consequent holding restriction against 1 is matched non-determinism is introduced: If the accepting state contains restrictions against 1, these restrictions are added as future obligations to be fulfilled for the trace. The other possibility is also added, that is, those cases where the last element of the consequent is matched, but not considered a consequent achievement. If more than one consequent is matched, then all possible combinations of situations are considered. Specifically in the algorithm, non-determinism is introduced by the condition GM ! goalMatched (line 11). When the latter holds the true value two states are added, one with GM = rue and the other with GM = false. In the first case a consequent is matched and obligations of the consequent are added as future restrictions of the trace. The second case represents the situation where the consequent achievement is omitted. 
Algorithm 1: Successor states
The presented algorithm can be optimized in those cases where a consequent holding no restriction against 1 is matched. Output calculation in these circumstances is simpler: The variable GM is assigned true (the consequent has been matched), and variable Obligations is also assigned true (the consequent holds no restrictions). Thus, testing the following condition can optimized the algorithm: 9 j ðgoalmatched½jÞ^RðC j Þ ¼ true. If this condition holds, then the mentioned assignment occurs. If the condition does not hold, the steps in line 11 are executed. Algorithms 2 and 3 describe the auxiliary procedures advanceAntecedent and advanceConsequent.
Transient accepting states
When the pattern described in the scenario is found, the automata enter into what we denominate transient accepting state. This state is introduced to make explicit the fact that the consequent has been fulfilled. The execution continues with an internal transition so that no observable actions from the system are missed. To accomplish this task, the algorithm introduces new transitions rules: h!; true; Oi À! k h!; false; Oi. A state S is accepting if and only if 9j (goalMatched[j]) or for every situation g 2 Situations(S) such that
Example
We provide a simple example to illustrate how the Büchi automaton is built. Suppose we are trying to build an automaton for the rule in Fig. 28 . This rule models one of the specification patterns presented in [22] : the Response pattern. The intent of the pattern is the following: every occurrence of the P event must be followed by the Q event. Figure 29 shows a partial construction of the automaton considering just two possible transitions. In the initial state, there exists only the empty situation. From this state, if P event occurs, then the initial situation advances, since both the antecedent and the consequent of the rule advance. A new situation arises, reflecting that the P event has been matched. What is more, in this situation the antecedent of the rule has been matched, but the consequent is not (event Q has not occurred yet at this point), so the state is tagged as a nonaccepting one. From this last state, if a Q event occurs, then the situation advances again, since the consequent of the rule is matched. Since the algorithm handles all the possible matchings, the situation shows two possible cases: This is the desired Q event, so both P and Q are matched, or Q is ignored, and only P is matched. This latter case contemplates the case where a future of Q will be the desired one instead of the present one. Note that this new state contains a situation where the rule is satisfied: Both the antecedent and the consequent have been matched. This is why this state is an accepting one. Figure 30 completes the example showing the automaton given as an output from the tableau procedure.
Tableau's soundness and completeness
In this section, we give an sketch of the correctness proof of the tableau procedure. We would like to prove, given an rule R, that the language accepted by the built automaton by the tableau for R is exactly the language denoted by the accepted traces of R. This implies that x-FVS rule's semantics and the tableau algorithm commutes, as it will be explained in Sect. 7.4.
We first introduce Lemma 7.1, upon the one the sketch of correctness will hold. This lemma relates traces of the system and states of the built automaton. In essence, the lemma says that every trace leading to a given state can be matched, at least, in one of the situations in that state. What is more, this matching is maximal with respect to the events involved. 
Algorithm 2: Procedure advanceAntecedent
Algorithm 3: Procedure advanceConsequent
Lemma 7.1 (Tableau states characterization) Given a rule R: f : A ! C; e : A 0 ! A; e i : C i ! C; i 2 ½1::k morphisms, a state S of the automaton obtained for R and a trace t leading to S, then 9 a situation g; g 2 S, including morphisms: g i : A 0 ! C i ; i 2 ½1::k, and 9h : A 0 ! t; h i :
::kÞ such that 
In the Lemma 7.1 morphisms h and every h i are the morphisms in a situation of the state that show the embedding to the trace. Both lemma's conditions characterize the traces leading to a given state of the built automaton. The first one links a trace leading to a state S to a morphism included in one of the situations belonging to that state. Furthermore, condition 2 requires the matching to be maximal in respect of events involved, since it guarantees that any possible matching to the trace is included in one of the morphisms of the situation. This lemma holds by construction considering situations' definition and how situations evolve when a change of state in the automata is triggered as defined in the algorithm previously described in Sect. 7.2. Favoring readability of this section, the complete demonstration of this lemma is detailed in Appendix 1.
In next we provide a sketch of the correctness proof, which is based on Lemma 7.1. Given a rule R, and a trace scenario S r we would like to prove that S r R if and only if S r seen as a trace is accepted by B (i.e, S r 2 LðBÞ), where B is the Büchi automaton built by the tableau for rule R.
We will now prove the first part: If S r R, then S r (seen as a trace) 2 LðBÞ. In order to do so is enough to prove the following points:
• 1: S r is recognizable by B (there are always transitions enabled), • 2: Visited 1 ðS r Þ j AcceptedðBÞ (accepted states are visited infinitely)
Given that S r R and using Lemma 7.1, it is easy to see that point (1) is satisfied, since every prefix sp of S r leading to a given state can be matched, at least, with one of the situations in that state. This indicates for every state there will be transitions enabled representing an advance, and eventually S r will be recognized. In order to prove point (2) we must show that for every prefix of a trace either the resulting automaton B is in an accepting state or eventually in the future an accepting state will be reached. In the former case there is nothing left to do since the current state is already an accepting state. In the latter case, since we know that S r R then the prefix can always be augmented in order to reach an accepting state. This concludes the first part of the proof. What is left to prove is that given a trace scenario S r , if S r (seen as a trace) 2 LðBÞ then S r R, where R is an scenariobased rule f : A ! C. That is, given a morphism m: A ! S r , we must prove that 9morphismm 0 :
In other words, there must exists a morphism in the accepting state that matches the morphisms of the rule. We first define those indexes in S r such that they have less precedence that those points defined in the antecedent: Index ¼ fi 2 N : 9P a 2 A^i ¼ #fp 2 S : p\mðP a Þgg þ 1. We call k to the maximum of the Index structure. Then, we know by Lemma 7.1 that reaches ðS r ½1::k; BÞ includes a state containing a situation g, holding a morphism m i : A 0 ! C i ; A 0 ¼ A; C i $C (Note that if the consequent is matched, then the state will be in a trap situation. Since once entered in a trap situation the state condition never changes, the trace will not by accepted, contradicting the initial assumptions). By definition, this state is a non-accepting state. Due to the fact that S r 2 LðBÞ9r such that reaches ðS r ½1::k þ r; BÞ includes an accepting state. In the state containing g we can perform the following analysis considering m i representations and its extensions in g. The extended sequence S r [1..k?r] can advance others possible matching besides m i . If this happens, for each new element in the extended sequence we can obtain an m q : A 0 ! C i þ feg, where e is new event matched, whereas m i remains unchanged. However, these other possible matchings will be eventually completed. This property, together with the fact that the set of situations having the antecedent matched is finite and bounded, indicates that in one point in the future the morphism m i will finally be completed (i.e, the consequent will be matched), thus leading to an accepting state. We also know that in an accepting state the consequent is fully matched, so this indicates that the morphism needed m 0 : C ! S r will be present in a situation in the accepting state. This proposition completes the proof's sketch.
End-to-end synthesis approach
In this section, we put pieces together to show how the endto-end translation from rules to Büchi automata works. The schema is graphically shown in Fig. 31 . Diagram 1 in Fig. 31 exhibits FVS and x-FVS semantics as explained in Sects. 3 and 4: Behavior is specified through rules, and semantics is given by the set of scenario traces satisfying those rules. What is more, given the definition of x-FVS semantics in Sect. 4, including morphisms and ghost events projection, it can be seen that Diagram 1 commutes.
Diagram 2 in Fig. 31 takes into the picture the tableau algorithm, which translates rules into Büchi automata. Diagram 2 also commutes as it was shown in Sect. 7, when discussing tableau's soundness and completeness. Diagrams 1 and 2 show that the Büchi automata build by the tableau for an x-FVS rule produces traces that seen as scenarios and projected into R a yields precisely the trace scenarios defined by the semantics of the rule. We still need to produce a Büchi automata that recognizes traces over R a without resorting to trace projection. However, this is achieved by the Büchi automaton B# R 0 defined in Sect. 2.1, having that R a = R 0 . As shown in Lemma 2.1 this automaton yields exactly the traces projected over R a . Therefore, we can establish that Diagram 3 in Fig. 31 also commutes. Note that traces and traces scenarios are in essence the same mathematical object due to the existence of injective mapping from traces to traces scenarios as seen in Sect. 2.1. Finally, since all the diagrams in Fig. 31 commute, it can be observed that, given an x-FVS rule R, the tableau builds a Büchi automaton such that its projection accepts every scenario trace satisfying R. This sketch can be extended when dealing with a set of rules S. For a set of rules S ¼ fr 1 ; r 2 ; . . .; r n g we proceed as follows. For S# R a the Büchi automaton that recognizes its traces is b # R a , where b ¼ def k B i , such that B i , 1 i n, is the automaton built by the tableau for every rule r i and k stands for the classical parallel composition operator.
As a final remark, it is worth mentioning that it is possible to add a post-processing step in order to simplify the automata built by our tableau algorithm. This is latter illustrated in the next section.
A study on automata size
The goal of this experiment is to indirectly determine not only whether the proposed tableau is sound and complete but whether it also yields automata of reasonable quality- in terms of the costs that would incur a model-checking procedure by using those automata as property monitors. As a measure of the complexity of an automaton, we decide to count the amount of states and transitions, as used in [52] . In particular, we check whether our automata, after applying a known automatic simplification step, are comparable in size with other proposed automata in the literature. In this sense, we chose to work with a highly representative set of LTL properties as those captured in the specification patterns proposed in [22] . The automata we compared are obtained from an online Büchi automata repository (see [14] ) introduced in [52] by the authors of the Graphical Tool for Omega-Automata and Logic (GOAL) tool [51] . This repository includes several kind of automata such as Nondeterministic Büchi, Deterministic Büchi, Deterministic Co-Büchi, Nondeterministic Muller. It is an open repository, and any user can upload its own automata indicating the formulae it accepts. For the purpose of our comparison, we selected only GOAL's nondeterministic Büchi automata for the chosen LTL formulae. It is important to note that these automata are obtained upon a large number of translation algorithms and latter enhanced with various optimization techniques or even having been manually optimized (and machinechecked for correctness) [14, 52] . As mentioned before, following [52] we decide to count the amount of states and transitions as one possible way to measure the complexity of an automaton. This is a simple measure that correlates with costs involved in verification processes such as model checking. What is more, in [52] this measure is used as a benchmark for comparison against others tools and translations. In this context, the mentioned measure stands as an useful way to compare complexity as an initial step. There exists other factors and measures to estimate these costs such as the non-determinism degree of the automata that we intend to address in future work.
In few words, the automata we compared are selected as follows. We took the LTL formula presented for the specification patterns as detailed in [21] . Afterwards, we search the corresponding non-deterministic Büchi automata in the online Büchi repository [14] . On the other hand, our automata are those built by the tableau for the rules modeling those patterns, which are in turn simplified using a third-party tool. The following subsection briefly describes the post-processing simplification step, whereas results of the experiment are presented in Sect. 8.2.
Bü chi automata simplification
The Büchi automata obtained through our tableau procedure can be manipulated in order to reduce its size measured by the number of states and transitions. It is known that minimizing Büchi automata is computationally difficult, since it includes operations in the PSPACE-hard category [24, 25] . Therefore, most tools and approaches focused on reducing Büchi automata size rely on simplification techniques, especially due to simulation equivalence and others heuristics [50] . For this experiment, we decided to use the GOAL tool [51] to simplify our automata.
Results
In this section, we present the obtained results. Figure 32 shows two examples including the Response pattern considering global scope and the Existence pattern considering Before scope. The LTL formula proposed in [21] for these patterns is hðP ! eQ) for the Response pattern and :PUðQ^:PÞ for the Existence pattern and before scope. The first column in Fig. 32 exhibits the automata obtained from the x-FVS rules modeling the mentioned patterns [3] , whereas the second column shows the automata that result after applying the simplification step. The last column shows the corresponding automata from the Büchi repository. Applying the mentioned complexity measure to these automata, we can note that GOAL's automata contain two states and four transitions for the Response pattern and two states and three transitions for the Existence pattern. The automaton produced by our tableau for the Response pattern contains six states and eight transitions, and the one produced for the Existence pattern has five states and six transitions. Finally, the simplified version of the automata for the Response pattern has three states and four transitions (the number of states and transitions were reduced by a half), whereas the simplified version of the automata for the Existence pattern has four states and five transitions for the Existence pattern (one less state and one less transition than the original version). Table 1 summarizes the automata size comparison for the LTL formulae associated with some selected specification patterns, which include the Response pattern, the Existence pattern, the precedence chain pattern, the response chain pattern, the constrained chain pattern and the two-bounded Existence pattern. We also include variants of these patterns, changing the scope or the amount of stimuli and responses for the chain flavored patterns. As mentioned, we selected all the patterns that were described in the pattern specification site [21] such that there was a corresponding Büchi automata in the Büchi online repository [14] . The patterns fulfilling these requirements constitute an interesting subset of the specification patterns, covering both occurrence and order type of patterns. Entries in the table follows a tuple notation (number of states, number of transitions). For those patterns modeling a chain of events, the notation (x-y) denotes the number of stimuli and responses, respectively.
By looking the results detailed in Table 1 it can be seen that the simplified version of automata built by the tableau procedure turns out to be roughly similar in size when compared to the automata included in the Büchi repository. We tend to consider these results as promising, since our approach is a general and homogeneous one, and not particularly tuned to be performant. Note that there is still room for improvement removing the k-transitions from the automata which are not eliminated by the optimization tool. Nonetheless, further investigation is needed to claim that the use of x-FVS and the proposed tableau is not negatively impacting verification performance.
Related work
We present related work in three different areas, according to the topics covered in this paper. The first one analyzes other scenario-based notations, the second one focuses on approaches handling specification patterns, while the last one analyzes other attempts to go beyond LTL expressive power.
Scenario-based notations
TimeEdit [48] and Graphical Interval Logic (GIL) [19] are two graphical specification languages based on timeline diagrams that do not feature partial ordering of events. TimeEdit is particularly focused on capturing complex chain events [4] , while x-FVS stands for a more general approach. TimeEdit features a restricted notion of triggered scenarios using required events (events that are required to occur if all previous events have occurred). This limitation makes properties about past events, or events occurring in a certain scope, harder to specify and understand. GIL provides search operators to locate end points of intervals, similar to next and previous in x-FVS. However, it previous operator cannot be applied freely as in x-FVS: Interval recognition starts always forward a generic (or the first) point in the enclosing interval. Thus, easily expressible situation in x-FVS-like correlation constrains or asserting the existence of a past in general cannot be stated in GIL. Finally, specification of complex properties involving several events in GIL requires nesting or stacking operators, threatening succinctness, ease of validation, and modifiability quality attributes. Other worth-mentioning approach is Property Sequence Chart (PSC) [4] , which is inspired in UML 2.0 Interaction Sequence Diagrams. PCS's notation is also validated modeling property specification patterns. As said by the authors, it might be difficult to directly express properties in this language, and some automated assistance tool may still be need to help the developer [5] . Denoting complex constraints between events may require textual annotations. In addition, properties in PCS are described as anti-scenarios (e.g., [1] ) and not as conditional or triggered scenarios.
Other visual formalisms based on Message Sequence Charts such as [27, 46, 53] have been proposed for scenario-based specifications. We share with them the idea of using partial orders to describe scenarios. However, the work presented in this paper differs in several aspects, especially regarding the trigger notation. In x-FVS, the antecedent pattern is not required to predicate on a prefix of the behavior. Additionally, x-FVS consequents can refer to events occurring before the trigger or interleaved with its events.
Finally, to our best knowledge, none of the previously mentioned approaches is equipped with deductive features for comparability or complementariness reasoning. In addition, none of them is capable of denoting x-regular properties.
Specification pattern-based approaches
Approaches like [42, 43] proposes an specification language based on a restricted English grammar inspired on the specification pattern system defined in [30] . Properties are translated into a formalism based on LTL. Contrary to x-FVS, the language does not provide validation mechanisms. In addition, x-FVS properties are denoted over a graphical notation instead of restricted grammar fashion, providing a more flexible approach.
The idea of defining events in terms of occurrence of other events has also been exploited in different areas. Mostly used in the artificial intelligence community Situation Calculus formalism [35, 55] allows to reason about available actions and to describe the impact these actions will have on the world being modeled. Another interesting approach is Complex Event Processing (CEP) [34] , where the main objective is to detect and react to event patterns as soon as possible. These ideas have been applied for database purposes and other applications based on a heavy data-flow interaction. Closer to our approach, [26] uses the concept of fluent to relate occurrence of events and predicate about system's behavior. A fluent represents an ongoing behavior, with a set of starting and ending events. x-FVS features a more rich and flexible triggering mechanism.
The language PSL [23, 29] is widely used by chip design and verification engineers across the hardware verification community. Hardware properties can be specified in PSL in order to verify the expected behavior. The language originated as the Sugar language and later evolved into an IEEE standard. It is heavily based on temporal logics (LTL), augmented with regular expressions. Although focused on hardware verification, we share some objectives with PSL. In the same spirit of our work, they acknowledge the need and value of reviewing and validating the property. However, this feature is achieved by introducing tools build on the top of PSL [7, 17] . So, contrary to x-FVS, validation capabilities requires tool support and cannot be obtained directly from PSL specifications.
Beyond LTL expressive power
Other approaches have also pointed out the need of more expressive specifications languages. Work in [6] proposed introducing aggregate operators in specification languages. In the same line, [2] and [38] consider support for aggregates in first-order logic and modal logic, respectively, whereas [8] extends specification formalisms with quantitative aspects.
More related to our work, a plethora of extensions have been suggested to overcome the limited expressive power of temporal logics and even some of them achieve the same expressive power as Büchi automata [6, 10, 31, 56, 59, 60] . For example, some logics like [10, 56, 59] incorporate operational features like automata to increase the expressive power. However, in occasions this expressive power upgrade might result in a serious threat to the language's usability, making most of the contributions of these approaches only relevant for theoretical aspects [45, 60] .
Conclusions and future work
In this work, we present x-FVS as a declarative language to ease the property specification process. The language is inspired on a graphical scenario-based notation, holding a compact syntax and semantics. Behavior is modeled by means of rules, and semantics is given by set of traces satisfying those rules. x-FVS is a simple extension of FVS. As said, FVS was designed to feature some useful validation tasks [3] . To overcome common expressive power problems in declarative specifications, x-FVS extends FVS Requirements Eng (2017) 22:239-274 263 by including ghosts events which allow the possibility of describe x-regular properties, a notable and distinguishable feature of our language. Language applicability is preliminary assessed modeling appealing examples, where requirements for some components of real life protocol's specifications are specified. In this sense, we conducted three different cases studies involving industrial-relevant examples to illustrate the main features of x-FVS. A tableau procedure is also given to translate x-FVS rules into Büchi automata, enabling the possibility of automatic analysis such as checking consistency of a set of rules or rule interference verification. Translated automata complexity is analyzed comparing its size against known automata accepting the same language obtained from an online Büchi repository [14] . Considering all these x-FVS characteristics, we believe this language stands for solid alternative to declaratively specify system's behavior.
Regarding future work, we would like to apply our approach to a case of study of industrial relevance to consolidate our results on usability. We are also planning to explore this approach within open systems, especially to synthesize Interface Automata [18] , taking into account controllability of events. Another interesting possibility is the construction of an inference or rewriting system based on concepts-like scenario specialization [11] . In addition, we are also considering an extension of the language to predicate over branching structures [47] . Similarly, we would like to explore the possibility of extending x-FVS to declaratively build a system from scratch upon the specified properties [20, 39] . Finally, we also would like to improve some performance aspects of our tableau algorithm.
We will know prove Lemma 7.1 detailed in Sect. 7.3. This lemma relates traces of the system and states of the built automaton. In essence, the lemma says that every trace leading to a given state can be matched, at least, in one of the situations in that state. What is more, this matching is maximal Lemma .1 (Tableau states characterization) Given a rule R:
f : A ! C; e : A 0 ! A; e i : C i ! C; i 2 ½1::k morphisms, a state S of the automaton obtained for R and a trace t leading to S, then 9 a situation g; g 2 S, including morphisms: g i : A 0 ! C i ; i 2 ½1::k, and 9h : A 0 ! t; h i :
Proof Note that the lemma is equivalent to 8 trace t and 8 state S such that t leads to S, condition 1 and condition 2 of the lemma hold. This is due to the fact that all the states are reachable. Thus, we will prove this formulation using an induction proof on the length of a given trace t. For the base case, we consider a trace with length = 0. We need to prove that 9 a situation g; g 2 S, including morphisms:
:k, and 9h : A 0 ! t; h i : C i ! tði 2 ½1::kÞ such that the conditions of the lemma hold. We can prove that the initial state of the automata S 0 is the desired state S. The initial state S 0 contains a situation including the empty morphism (i.e., a morphism from ; ! ;). This situation is actually the expected situation g. What is more, the empty morphism also constitutes the morphisms h and h i wanted, since t has length = 0. Therefore it can be trivially seen that h i g i ¼ h, satisfying condition 1 of the lemma. Condition 2 is also satisfied, since the only valid morphism for a trace t with length = 0 is the empty morphism, which is present in the initial state S 0 . Now we prove the lemma for a trace with length = n ? 1, assuming that the conditions holds for traces with length = n, which constitutes the Induction Hypothesis. We will note as t nþ1 an arbitrary trace with length n ? 1, and t n the trace t nþ1 without its last element (noted as minterm m). In order to prove the lemma for t nþ1 we need to see that 8 state S 0 , where t nþ1 leads to S 0 , 9 a situation g 0 , including morphisms g 0 i , such that both conditions of the lemma hold. Due to the equivalence between traces and trace scenarios (see Definition 3.7), we can see trace t nþ1 as a succession of minterms. We know by the induction hypothesis that for t n 9 a situation g; g 2 S, including morphisms: g i : A 0 ! C i ; i 2 ½1::k, and 9h : A 0 ! t n ; h i : To prove condition 2 we proceed as follows. We assume that the maximality condition does not hold for t nþ1 . Therefore, there exists situation g 0 such that 9 state S 0 ; t nþ1 leads to S 0 ; g 0 6 2 S 0 . We know that the range of g 0 includes minterm m, the last minterm of t nþ1 . Otherwise, g 0 would have been a situation for t n , which is an absurd since by know by the induction hypothesis that the maximality condition holds for t n . Lets considerate a situation g that eliminates n ? 1 from the situation g 0 . That is, it removes all the pairs that are related to n ? 1. It is easy to see that g is a situation of t n . Consequently, we know by the induction hypothesis that 8 state S, where t n leads to S; g 2 S.
However, since the algorithm advances all possible situations in each state, g 0 would have been included in one of the successors of S when calculating the processing of minterm m. This contradicts our assumption, so we are forced to conclude that the maximality conditions hold for a traces t nþ1 , and condition 2 is satisfied. Since both conditions hold, the lemma is demonstrated. h
Appendix 2: .NET NegotiateStream protocol example modeled in x-FVS
In this appendix we model the behavior of the client and the server of the .NET NegotiateStream protocol following its specification document [36] . The modeling assumptions described in Sect. 6.3 also apply to this appendix.
Client behavior modeled in x-FVS
The most important sections of the specification document describing the client behavior are: section 3. • R3: If the application requests data to be transferred while not in the Authenticated state, an error must be returned.
The last subsection of the Sect. 3.1.4 Higher-Layer Triggered events deals with the application request to close a stream. This is described in requirement R4 (shown in Fig. 35 ). Since the application can, at any time request that the stream to be closed, be use the event AnyStreamState to represent the disjunction of all possible states of the stream.
• R4: When a request to close the stream is received, the stream state must be set to Closed. The application can at any time request that the stream be closed.
We now describe the behavior of the client as detailed in section 3.1.5 Message Processing Events and Sequencing rules of the specification document.
Message processing events and sequencing rules: client side
The following requirements deal with the message processing events and sequencing rules while the stream state is CreatingSecurityToken, as detailed in section 3.1.5.1 of the specification document. In this case, the GSS-API returns any of three possible outcomes: ERROR, to report that an error has occurred, GSS_S_Complete to indicate the end of the negotiation, or GSS_S_Continue_Needed to indicate that further negotiation is needed. The rule in the top of Fig. 35 describes these assumptions. Requirements R5, R6, and R7 handle the expected behavior for any possible outcome value.
• R5: If the GSS_Init_sec_context returns a status of GSS_S_Complete, the stream state must be set to WaitingForHandshakeDone.
• R6: If the GSS_Init_sec_context returns a status of GSS_S_Continue_Needed, the stream state must be set to WaitingForHandshakeMessage.
• R7: If the GSS_Init_sec_context returns a status of ERROR, the stream state must be set to Uninitialized. Fig. 36 different consequents (one for each option), and the rules below that one reflect the expected change of state. The requirements extracted from the section 3.1.5.2 of the specification document, which is focused on the WaitingForHandshakeMessage state, are described next and shown as rules in Fig. 37 .
Rules in
• R8: Upon the receipt of a message HandshakeInProgress, the stream state must be set to CreatingSecurityToken.
• R9: Upon the receipt of a message HandshakeDone, the stream state must be set to ProcessingFinalToken.
• R10: Upon the receipt of a message of ERROR, the stream state must be set to Closed.
Section 3.1.5.3 of the specification document focuses on the ProcessingFinalToken state. In this case, if the GSS-API returns a value of GSS_S_Complete, this indicates that the negotiation succeeded and the stream state enters the Authenticated state so that data transmission can be initiated. Otherwise, the stream state is set to Uninitialized. These are requirements R11 and R12, which are shown in Fig. 38 .
We now model requirements extracted from section 3.1.5.4, focused on the WaitingForHandshakeDone state of the specification document. These requirements (requirements R13 and R14) involve the end of the negotiation, either because a HandshakeDone event has been received (indicating that the negotiation is over and data transmission can begun) or because an error has occurred.
• R13: If the message has a handshakeId of HandshakeDone, the stream state must be set to Authenticated.
• R14: If the message has a handshakeId of ERROR, the stream must be set to Closed. Fig. 39 reflect the expected behavior denoted in requirements R13 and R14. Finally, the client behavior is completed with section 3.1.5.5 Receiving Data in the Authenticated state of the specification document. Requirement R15 says that stream state keeps the Authenticated state while data are being transmitted (represented by the eventsSendData and ReceiveData). The rule for this requirement is shown in Fig. 40 .
Server behavior modeled in x-FVS Section 3.2 Server details of the specification document describes the behavior of the server. Regarding the server's perspective, the possible states for the stream are: Uninitialized, CreatingSecurityToken, WaitingForHandshakeMessage, ProcessingFinalToken, Authenticated, and Closed. Section 3.2.4 Higher-Layer triggered events of the specification document describes how the server • R16: Uninitialized is the initial state of the stream.
C r e a ti n g S e c u r i ty T o k e n _ e n t e r e d GSS_S_Complete
• R17: If an application invocation is received when the stream state is not equal to Unitialized, an error must be returned to the application.
• R18: If the function returns GSS_S_Complete, the implementation must set the stream state to WaitingForHandshakeMessage. Fig. 41 exhibit the expected behavior of requirements R16, R17 and R18. Fig. 37 Rules modeling requirements R8, R9, and R10 • R20: When a request to close the stream is received, the stream state must be set to Closed. The application can at any time request that the stream be closed. Fig. 39 Rules modeling requirements R13 and R14 • R21: Upon the receipt of a message HandshakeInProgress, the stream state must be set to CreatingSecurityToken.
Rules in
W a it in g F o r H a n d s h a k e M e s s a g e _ e n te r e d HandshakeInProgress
P r o c e s s i n g F i n a l T o k e n _ e n t e r e d
A u th e n t ic a t e d _ e n t e r e d SendData
• R22: Upon the receipt of a message HandshakeDone, the stream state must be set to ProcessingFinalToken.
• R23: Upon the receipt of a message of ERROR, the stream state must be set to Closed. Fig. 44 Fig. 45 Rules modeling requirements R24, R25, and R26 Fig. 45 model requirements R24, R25 , and R26. The first rule describes the possible outcomes using three different consequents (one for each option), and the rules below that one reflect the expected change of state. Section 3.2.5.3 ProcessingFinalToken State of the specification document introduces two new requirements (shown in Fig. 46 ). Those are
Rules in
P r o c e s s i n g F i n a l T o k e n _ e n t e r e d GSS_S_Complete
Rules in
• R27 If the GSS_Init_sec_context returns a status of GSS_S_Complete, the stream state must be set to Authenticated.
• R28: If the GSS_Init_sec_context returns a status of ERROR, the stream state must be set to Uninitialized.
Finally, section 3.2.5.4 of the specification document deals with the information exchanged in the Authenticated state. This behavior is analogs to that presented when modeling the client: The stream state keeps the Authenticated state, while data are being transmitted (represented by the eventsSendData and ReceiveData). The rule for this requirement (R29) is shown in Fig. 47 .
Translation of x-FVS rules into Büchi automata
We now conclude this appendix showing a simplified version (in not showing accepting states) of the automata generated using the tableau algorithm described in Sect. 7. Figure 48 shows the automaton describing the behavior of the client, whereas Fig. 49 reflects the behavior of the server. In order to favor readability, ghosts events are shown in italics, whereas actual events are not.
